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Abstract  Competition policy has great relevance to all the firms in any 
economy. Even though it is unlikely that small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) have enough market power to constrain competition through a misuse of 
such power, they may still face prosecution if they are involved in a boycott of 
competitors or suppliers, price-fixing, output-restriction and other monopoly 
agreements. This paper discusses antitrust issues pertaining to SMEs with a 
focus on China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) and its implementation rules. 
Contrary to the popular view that SMEs benefit from competition laws, evidence 
shows that they are reluctant to get involved in antitrust litigation against large 
firms partly because of the high legal costs involved. There is an urgent need to 
promote an awareness of antitrust compliance in China and to educate SMEs 
about the need to avoid breaching the new antitrust law and its associated 
regulations. In the meantime, SMEs should take full advantage of the antitrust 
laws to fight against abuse of market dominance directed at them, and to gain 
equal opportunities to market access. 
 
Keywords   competition policy, SMEs, China, AML, public interest 
 
1 Introduction 
 
More than one hundred years after the enactment of the Sherman Act in the US, 
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) was passed in 2007 and became effective 
since 1 August 2008.  Competition policy has great relevance to all the firms in 
the economy, including small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs).
1
 Even 
though it is unlikely that SMEs would have enough market power to constrain 
competition through the misuse of such power, they may still face prosecution if 
they engage in a boycott of competitors or suppliers, price-fixing, output 
restriction and other monopoly agreements.  It has been widely acknowledged 
that SMEs are the backbone of the economy and that they are necessary to foster 
competitive market structures. As a result, they have been granted exemptions 
from the application of antitrust laws in some activities which might be deemed 
illegal if engaged in by large companies. Meanwhile, complaints against large 
firms lodged by SMEs are frequently not upheld by antitrust authorities due to 
economic efficiency considerations. Such concerns have played a central role in 
decisions made by the US antitrust authorities, and have been increasingly 
embraced by the EU.   
This paper first reviews competition policy in China, the US, and EU, and 
then discusses the antitrust issues pertaining to SMEs with a focus on China’s 
AML and its implementation rules. This research has important practical and 
                                                 
1 The terms competition policy and antitrust policy are used interchangeably in this paper.  
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policy implications as it is important for the Chinese SMEs to understand the 
new AML and its implementation rules, and their relevance to them. It is also 
important for China’s antitrust enforcement agencies to learn from their overseas 
counterparts and to develop a culture for encouraging competition in the 
economy. 
 
2 An Overview of the Competition Policy in China, the US and EU 
 
The competition policy of a country is embodied in its antitrust laws. The goal 
of antitrust laws in many developed countries is to protect customers against the 
creation and exercise of market power, and help restore or enhance competition 
given the existence of state-owned, private or regulated monopolies. Antitrust 
laws can also be used to mitigate market failure where markets do not efficiently 
organise production or allocate goods and services to consumers. Competition 
policy deals with three principal areas─monopoly, restrictive practices, and 
mergers. 
 
2.1 China 
Before 1978, China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and collectively owned 
enterprises dominated the economy. There was no need to promote competition 
among these enterprises. After more than 10 years of economic reform, the 
government declared in 1992 that the central goal of China’s economic reform 
was to establish a “socialist market economy”. In the 15 years since this 
declaration, China’s economic structures have undergone dramatic changes. In 
particular, from the late 1990s, apart from certain key industries, the government 
has largely taken a hands-off approach to SMEs, encouraging them to be 
privatised. 
    China’s AML came into effect on 1 August 2008. It included provisions 
governing monopoly agreements, abuse of market dominance and merger 
control.  Two main areas called for such a comprehensive antitrust law. First, 
administrative monopolies have been subject to extensive criticisms, with 
demands that more competition needs to be introduced into the industries that 
are dominated by the state-owned or state-controlled enterprises. Second, many 
leading multinationals have dominated in many areas in China, such as 
computer operating systems, internet equipment, cameras, flexible packaging, 
cosmetics, beer and soft drinks. Their dominant position was acquired either 
through their own intellectual property, or through mergers and acquisitions. 
The survival of SMEs in these industries was threatened.  Effective antitrust 
legislation was needed to challenge the acquisition and strengthening of these 
dominant positions by multinationals, and to monitor their potential 
anticompetitive conduct.  
 4 
    The antitrust policy of almost all countries has the purpose of protecting 
competition. However, these days most economists would agree that protecting 
competition is not the end, and that eventual goal of competition policy should 
be to increase efficiency, i.e., to maximise the sum of consumer surplus and 
producer surplus. Under this goal, the overall benefits including the interests of 
consumers, producers, resource owners, shareholders and other stakeholders will 
be considered. It is also believed that consumer welfare can only be maximised 
when total welfare is maximised.   
    The second type of goal of antitrust in practice is to increase the welfare of 
consumers, which means that any antitrust action should result in net consumer 
gains. When dealing with a merger, antitrust authorities need to ensure that 
consumers can share some part of the efficiency gains, such as enjoying lower 
prices or better quality products.
2
 
    The third welfare goal of antitrust was developed in the Canadian Jurisdiction 
in the case Commissioner of Competition v. Superior Propane Inc.(2000) 7 CPR 
(4th) 385 Comp. Trib.
3
 It is also known as the balancing weights standard. This 
welfare standard seeks to “determine the weight to be given to the loss of 
consumer surplus that results from the conduct in question, such as a merger, 
having an overall neutral effect on social welfare, and then seeks to compare this 
weight with some subjective social expectation of what ‘true’ social weighting 
should be given”.
4
 However, Ross and Winter (2005) noted that the balancing 
weights goal is not feasible because of the lack of information and the 
interpretation problem.
5
 Therefore, this approach is unlikely to be adopted by a 
developing country where the antitrust authorities have little antitrust 
experience,
6
 which is also the case for China.   
    China’s AML states that “this law is enacted for the purposes of prohibiting 
monopolistic conduct, safeguarding the order of market competition, protecting 
the legitimate rights and interests of consumers and public interests and ensuring 
the healthy development of the socialist market economy”.  This objective has 
been criticised for its lack of focus on economic efficiency as the primary goal 
of competition. Although competition policy in virtually every country has to 
seek non-efficiency objectives as can been seen later in this paper, it is better not 
to incorporate these goals in the antitrust legislation itself. Otherwise, the 
                                                 
2 Round, D. K. & Zuo, Z., The Welfare Goal of Antitrust Laws in Asia: for Whom Should the 
Law Toil? 22 Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, 31-56(2008). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5  Ross, T. W., & Winter, R. A., The Efficiency Defense in Merger Law: Economic 
Foundations and Recent Canadian Developments, 72 Antitrust Law Journal, 471-503 (2005). 
6 See Round and Zuo, fn. 2. 
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enforcement agencies have to face “contradictory instructions”, or “too much 
discretion” and “legislative power will be delegated to the bureaucracy”.
7
 The 
multiple-objective nature of China’s AML thus leaves some uncertainty for 
antitrust decisions in relation to SMEs.  
    The enforcement of the AML is undertaken by the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), the State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce, and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), which respectively are 
responsible for price-related restrictive agreements and abusive conduct, non-
price related market manipulation including the acts of abusing administrative 
power, and excessive concentration of enterprises.  
 
 
2.2  The US 
Monopoly conduct by the large trusts in the US in the late nineteenth century, 
that were thought to have the potential to hurt consumers and small businesses, 
led to the Sherman Act of 1890, which prohibited both unilateral monopoly and 
collusion in broad terms. Motta (2004) noted that price wars were common due 
to the periodic and persistent economic crises (1873–78 and 1883–86).
8
 To 
respond to price wars and market instability, cartels and trusts were organised to 
help firms maintain high prices and margins. Consumers became the direct 
victims. Farmers and small businesses were also affected, facing the threat of 
being driven out of business. Sympathy for farmers and small businesses led to 
the creation of antitrust laws in many states as well as the new federal law, the 
Sherman Act.
9
 This reaction shows that politicians at that time realised the 
serious social consequences of anti-competitive behaviour.  
The Sherman Act was not very strictly enforced until 1897, when the 
Supreme Court ruled that a trust of 18 railways
10
 that fixed freight charges for 
the transport of goods was illegal.
11
 Also, in the Addyston Pipe and Steel 
decision,
 12
 the court clearly rejected the argument that price fixing was used as a 
way to prevent unhealthy competition. The judge took the view that the court 
was in no position to decide which price agreements were reasonable and which 
were not.
13
  Thus, the ban on price agreements became a strong precedent which 
                                                 
7  Owen, B.M., Sun, S. & Zheng, W., Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive 
Compatibility, 1 Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 123-148(2005). 
8  Motta, M., Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge (2004). 
9 Id. 
10 US v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).  
11 See Motta, fn. 8. 
12 Addyston pipe & Steel  Co. v. US, 175 US. 211 (1899). 
13 See Motta, fn. 8. 
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is still the norm today in most countries. In the Standard Oil 
14
and American 
Tobacco 
15
cases, predatory pricing and engaging in price wars to eliminate 
competition were condemned and disallowed. In Standard Oil, the “rule of 
reason” was introduced, which means that only restraints of trade that were 
unreasonable were considered violations of the Sherman Act. Since then the test 
of “reasonableness” has given defendants the opportunity to justify their 
challenged activities as being reasonable because they do not substantially 
damage existing competitive conditions.
16
 This implies that antitrust laws do not 
protect SMEs per se.  
A merger between two firms could potentially restrain competition, yet the 
rule of reason approach is always applied to mergers and as a result, many 
proposed mergers have been approved under the Clayton Act, which came in 
effect in 1914, extending the Sherman Act’s reach.
17
  During the period between 
the two world wars, antitrust policy was relaxed.
18
 A new period of intense 
antitrust activity occurred from the Socony–Vacuum Oil
19
 decision in 1940 to 
the mid-1970s. The 1968 Department of Justice (DOJ) Merger Guidelines were 
consistent with the tight precedents that the Supreme Court had set, in which 
efficiency claims were regarded as unreliable. Market structure was the focus of 
the DOJ’s merger policy, with a philosophy that the conduct of the individual 
firms in a market was determined by the structure of that market. As a result, 
much consideration was given to concentration levels in the Guidelines, and 
mergers above certain concentration threshold levels would most likely be 
challenged. 
Supported by the theory of contestable markets,
20
 a more lenient approach to 
merger control was adopted in the 1980s. In addition, the critiques from the 
Chicago School and the fact that US firms had lost competitive advantages 
abroad, directed attention to the efficiency effects of business practices.
21
 This 
was reflected in the 1982 Merger Guidelines, which abandoned most constraints, 
in keeping with the economic philosophy advocated by the Chicago School. 
                                                 
14 Standard Oil of New Jersey v. US, 221 US 1 (1911). 
15 US v. American Tobacco,221 US 106 (1911). 
16 Joelson, M.R., An International Antitrust Primer: A Guide to the Operation of United 
States, European Union and Other Key Competition Laws in the Global Economy. 3rd ed., 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague (2006). 
17  Mueller, D.C., Merger Policy in the United States: A Reconsideration, 12 Review of 
Industrial Organisation, 655–685 (1997). 
18 See Motta, fn. 8. 
19 US v. Socony–Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. et al. 310 US 150 (1940). 
20 See Baumol, W.J., Panzar, J.C. & Willig, R.D., Contestable Markets and the Theory of 
Industry Structure. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, San Diego (1982). 
21 See Motta, fn. 8. 
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Coordinated behaviour as described by Stigler’s (1964) collusion theory was 
also addressed in the 1982 Merger Guidelines.
22
 Although market concentration 
data were still important, there was a “need for evidence of harm or potential 
harm to competition before a merger will be challenged”.
23
 The 1984 revisions 
to the 1982 Guidelines moved further away from reliance on market 
concentration. A merger would not be challenged solely on the basis of 
concentration and market share data. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the US 
Government changed little in its antitrust policies. The increasing debate on 
efficiency led to the 1997 Merger Guidelines which explicitly stated that 
efficiencies could increase the competitiveness of firms by increasing their 
incentives and abilities to compete.
24
 
Foer (2001) claimed that the rise of the Chicago School distanced the 
relationship between small businesses and antitrust enforcers partly because of 
the emphasis on efficiency that is usually associated with big firms and 
concentration.
25
 Predatory pricing claims that could be used to assist small 
businesses were also dismissed by the Chicago School. It has been made 
particularly difficult for plaintiffs to prove the existence of such behaviour in 
court since the 1993 case Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp.
26
  
 
2.3 EU 
On the other side of the Atlantic, Europeans traditionally have taken a different 
attitude towards economic concentration, and consequently their approach for 
dealing with cartel activities has differed.
27
  During the second half of the 
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, cartel activities 
were commonly seen in many parts of commercial life in some European 
countries. Cartels were tolerated and sometimes encouraged by governments, 
especially after the great depression. The German economy especially was 
characterised by cartelisation, especially in the heavy industries. Even in the UK 
                                                 
22 Stigler, G.J., A Theory of Oligopoly,72 Journal of Political Economy, 44–61(1964). 
23 US Department of Justice, Explanation and Summary of the Merger Guidelines at 3, 
reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep (CCH) No. 546 at 58 (June 16, 1982). 
24 Kolasky, W. & Dick, A., The Merger of Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into 
Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers. Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr Antitrust 
Series, Working Paper 31 (2003), available at http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/papers/art31(last 
visited May 10, 2010). 
25 Foer, A.A., Small Business and Antitrust, 16 Small Business Economics, 3-20 (2001). 
26 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (92-466), 509 US 209 (1993). 
27 Harding, C. & Joshua, J., Regulating Cartels in Europe: A Study of Legal Control of 
Corporate Delinquency. Oxford University Press: New York (2003). 
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policy shifted towards pro-cartelisation from pro-free trade, encouraging 
cartelisation in the coal mining and cotton industries,
28
 thereby creating an 
unfriendly business environment for SMEs.  
After World War Two, decartelization was introduced in occupied Germany 
and price-fixing was banned by the allied decartelisation laws. Germany passed 
a competition law in 1957 to restrict the concentration of economic power. The 
establishment of the European Economic Community in the late 1950s implied 
conflicting goals between the common market and the business cartels. Because 
of the strong American anti-cartel commitment, significant provisions against 
cartels were included in the Treaty of Paris that created the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC).
29
 Article 65 in the Treaty prohibited agreements and 
concerted practices between firms or associations of firms to directly or 
indirectly prevent, restrict or distort normal competition within the Common 
Market. This provision is reflected by Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (Article 81 in the EC Treaty). 
Article 66 of the Treaty of Paris deals with the abuse of market power, which is 
carried through to Article 102 of the TFEU (Article 82 of the EC Treaty).  
The current TFEU deals with competition issues in Articles 101 to 109. The 
major provisions are contained in Articles 101 and 102. Article 101 lists the 
practices that are prohibited, including fixing prices and limiting or controlling 
production, markets, technical development, etc. Article 102 states that “Any 
abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
common market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States”. The 
principle underlying this Article is that a firm in a dominant position should not 
eliminate or distort competition. However, the Commission has long held the 
view that cooperation among SMEs may be desirable and that arrangements 
between SMEs should be exempted from application of the competition rules by 
the de minimis rule. The Commission Notice on agreements of minor 
importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 81(1) of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community (2001/C 368/07) 
acknowledges that “agreements between small and medium-sized 
undertakings… are rarely capable of appreciably affecting trade between 
member states”.
30
 
                                                 
28 Resch, A., Phases of Competition Policy in Europe. Institute of European Studies, UC, 
Berkeley (2005). Available at http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/7wr2g49j?display=all (last 
visited  December 10, 2010). 
29 Id. 
30 http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2001:368:0013:0015:EN:PDF (last 
visited February 1, 2011). 
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The European Court of Justice, in two leading cases, Continental Can
31
 and 
Philip Morris
32
 provided the basis for establishing merger control in the EC 
before the introduction of Merger Regulations 4064/89.
33
 The first case 
established that the strengthening of a dominant position through merger could 
be seen as an abuse and should be prohibited under Article 102. The second case 
recognised that the acquisition of a minority shareholding in a competitor could 
be caught by Article 101 (then Article 85) if increased concentration occurred. A 
new Merger Regulation came into force on 1 May 2004 (139/2004), replacing 
Regulation 4064/89. The power of the Commission has been greatly increased in 
this new law. In all cases that fall under the scope of application of Articles of 
101 and 102, Member States’ national laws do not apply. A new substantive test 
(or “significant impediment to effective competition” (SIEC) test) was 
introduced in Article 2(3), replacing the dominance test. This new test has 
brought the regulation closer to the substantial lessening of competition test used 
in other jurisdictions.
34
 
Historically efficiency was not given much consideration in the EU. 
However, in the Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers issued by 
the Commission, efficiency claims will be considered as a likely effect in a 
merger, consistent with the approach of the US antitrust authorities.
35
 
    Competition decision-makers clearly rely heavily on economic reasoning and 
evidence. The shift of the methodology in the industrial organisation literature 
reflects the change of economists’ views on competition in oligopoly markets, 
and, in turn, has shaped governments’ competition policies. It seems that the 
competition policies of the US and EU (and, in fact, those of many other 
developed economies) have converged in many respects such as the efficiency 
consideration, which have significant implications for SMEs. In the next section, 
issues relevant to SMEs will be spelt out and discussed, mainly in China’s 
context.   
 
 
3 The Relevance of Antitrust Laws to SMEs 
There are various definitions for SMEs across countries. In China, the current 
2003 definitions for SMEs depend on the industry categories (Table 1). It is 
                                                 
31  Case 6/72 Continental Can v Commission (1973) ECR 215.   
32 Joint Cases 142 and 156/84, British American Tobacco and Reynolds v. Commission (1987) 
ECR 4487. 
33 See Joelson, fn. 16. 
34 Christiansen, A., The Reform of EU Merger Control – Fundamental Reversal or Mere 
Refinement? Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Marburg 
(2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=898845 (last visited  May 12, 2010). 
35 See Joelson, fn. 16. 
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worth noting that SMEs in China can include relatively large firms with up to 
3,000 employees compared with those in other countries, and therefore there 
exists much greater relevance of antitrust laws to SMEs.  
Table 1: Definitions of SMEs in China 
Industries  SMEs meet one or more of the following conditions.  
Number of  
employees  
 Sales revenue 
(10,000 yuan) 
Total assets 
(10,000 yuan) 
Manufacturing  < 2,000 <30,000 <40,000 
Construction <3,000 <30,000 <40,000 
Wholesale trade <200 <30,000  
Retail trade <500 <15,000  
Transport <3,000 <30,000  
Post <1,000 <30,000  
Accommodation and 
restaurants  
<800 <15,000  
Source:  National Economic and Trade Committee SMEs no. 143, 2003.  
    Based on these criteria, 99% of the country’s 10.3 million companies are 
SMEs, accounting for more than 80 percent of urban employment, and 
producing 60 percent of China’s GDP.
36
  In the OECD countries, SMEs account 
for more than 95% of firms and 60-70% of employment.
37
 Schaper (2010) 
summarised the following features of small businesses that differentiate them 
from large firms.
38
 Medium-sized firms may also possess most of these features: 
 Geographically constrained with the vast majority having only one 
working location 
 Sell a very limited range of goods and services 
 Have limited market share 
 Depend on a handful of clients 
 Bear disproportionately more expensive regulatory compliance costs 
 Suffer from information asymmetry 
 Less likely to access established suppliers 
 Usually unincorporated  
 Possess limited financial resources 
                                                 
36 Zhong, N. & Zhang, J. Smaller Firms to Benefit from New Definition of SMEs. China Daily, 
27 October (2010). Available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-
10/27/content_11463340.htm (last visited  September 20, 2010). 
37  OECD, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: Local Strength, Global Reach. OECD 
Observer, June, 1-7 (2000). 
38 Schaper, M.T., Competition Law, Enforcement and the Australian Small Business Sector, 
17 Small Enterprise Research, 7-18 (2010). 
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 Have limited access to skilled advice 
 
3.1 Antitrust Laws Ensure Equitable Opportunities for SMEs  
 
SMEs deserve some special treatment, not only because they act as an impetus 
for economic growth in many economies including China, but also because their 
inherent characteristics (as summarised above) suggest that are they most likely 
lack financial strength, meaning that they could be easily driven out of the 
market by their large rivals. It is not uncommon that vertical agreements lead to 
large firms controlling raw materials and more than one level of the supply 
chain, forcing SMEs to rely on them for supply.
39
 Foer (2001) noted that 
antitrust enforcement restrains market power on both the supply and buying side, 
thereby keeping down the prices of goods and services that small businesses 
depend on and protecting small businesses from being crushed by the need to 
sell to much more powerful buyers.
40
 Constraining the abuse of market power 
by dominant firms not only benefits consumers, but also ensures that SMEs have 
equal opportunities to participate in the economy.  
    In many countries including the EU, agreements between competitors whose 
market share is small are in the main unlikely to be prosecuted.  This is so also 
because antitrust agencies have limited resources and have to narrow the focus 
of their investigations.  China’s AML (Article 15(3)) explicitly exempts an 
agreement from antitrust if it is for the purpose of enhancing the efficiency and 
reinforcing the competitiveness of SMEs. Further implicit antitrust immunity for 
SMEs can be found in Article 19 in which market share de minimis is set to 
determine whether a business might be in a dominant position: 
(1) A business operator accounts for 1/2 of the market share; 
(2) Two business operators account for  2/3 of the market share; 
(3) Three business operators account for 3/4 of the market share.  
A business operator with a market share of less than 10% shall not be 
presumed as having a dominant status even if they fall within the scope of 
the second or third item. 
    In addition, there is no need to notify the antitrust authorities if the turnover of 
the undertakings involving concentration does not meet the notification 
thresholds published by the Chinese State Council on 3 August 2008
41
.The 
                                                 
39 Kampel, K., The Role of South African Competition Law in Supporting SMEs (2004).           
Available at http://www.competition-regulation.org.uk/conferences/southafrica04/kampel.pdf 
(last visited September 30, 2010). 
40 See Foer, fn. 25. 
41 The thresholds are: the combined worldwide turnover of all undertakings involved in the 
last financial year exceeds 10 billion yuan, and at least two undertakings’ turnover in China 
each exceeds 400 million yuan; or the combined China-wide turnover of all undertakings 
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existence of the AML gives SMEs the option to sue the big players that exhibit 
anti-competitive behaviour, thereby making themselves better off compared to 
the situation that would apply in the absence of a competition law.
42
       
    SMEs are most likely to be adversely affected by a concentration. China’s 
Anti-Monopoly Bureau of MOFCOM blocked the proposed takeover of 
Huiyuan Juice by Coca-Cola in 2009.
43
 One of the reasons for this decision was 
that the domestic small juice makers would be negatively impacted by the 
acquisition.  This might be true if the relevant market only contained pure and 
high concentration fruit and vegetable juices, in which Huiyuan had a market 
share of more than 40 per cent by the end of 2008. Although Coca-Cola had a 
very low share in this market, the combined market share after takeover could 
exceed 50 per cent, posing a potential threat to the survival of other SMEs in this 
market.  Even if the relevant market also includes low concentration fruit and 
vegetable juice drinks, which means the two merged companies together would 
have a market share of less than 20 per cent, Coca-Cola could still quickly 
expand its market share using Huiyuan’s existing distributors and sales offices 
and its dominant status in the carbonated drink market (more than 50 per cent) 
through tying, bundling or other forms of exclusive dealing.   Consequently, 
entry into the fruit and vegetable juice market would become more difficult. The 
decision to block the takeover demonstrates that a significant weight has been 
given to SMEs by Chinese antitrust authorities in formulating an antitrust 
decision.  
 
3.2 SMEs May Have Different Perceptions  
In contrast, the Federation of Hong Kong Industries (2007) presented an 
interesting view in its discussion of whether Hong Kong needs a competition 
law: 
Contrary to the popular belief that introducing a cross-sector competition 
law would benefit SMEs, there is evidence that the law would provide a 
convenient avenue for large corporations to sue their smaller counterparts 
for anti-competition. Since many SMEs cannot afford to pay the huge legal 
                                                                                                                   
involved in the last financial year exceeds 2 billion yuan, and at least two undertakings’ 
turnover in China each exceeds 400 million yuan. 
42 Lin, P. & Chen, K.Y., Fair Competition Under Laissez-Faireism: Policy Options for Hong 
Kong. Lingnan University of Hong Kong (2008). Available at 
http://www.ln.edu.hk/econ/staff/plin/Fair%20Competition%20under%20Laissex%20Faireism
.pdf. (last visited  December 12, 2010). 
43  Sun, J., The Implementation of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: A Case on Coca-Cola’s 
Abortive Acquisition of Huiyuan Juice, 6 Frontiers of Law in China, 117-130 (2011). 
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costs involved, not to mention the time and energy required of management 
in such lawsuits, large corporations could eliminate competitors in the 
courtrooms without having to competing with them in the market place.
44
  
    Possibly due to the high legal costs, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) of 
UKindicates that about 25 per cent of SMEs in the UK claim that they are the 
victims of unfair practices such as price-fixing and bid-rigging, but only 22 per 
cent would report price-fixing agreements between competitors and only 9 per 
cent would report an instance of predatory pricing.
45
 The OFT Chairman thus 
urged SMEs to turn to the competition authorities for help: 
Practices such as price-fixing and bid-rigging harm the competitiveness of 
our economy. SMEs have rights and obligations under competition law and 
can work more with the OFT to identify and stop anti-competitive 
behaviour. We must ensure that SMEs are informed about—and in turn 
inform—our work.
46
  
    A similar story that antitrust does not offer effective protection from the 
misuse of market power can also be found in Australia
47
 and the US.
48
 It is 
believed that the theoretical benefit for small businesses is not always realised 
partly due to the underfunding of the enforcement agencies.
49
 This is also 
because not enough attention has been paid to small businesses. It is no 
exception that China’s new antitrust enforcement agencies have limited 
resources and little experience in dealing with antitrust cases and therefore, there 
is much work for China’s SMEs to do to influence the decisions of the antitrust 
authorities. In the Coca-Cola-Huiyuan case, it is believed that the strong 
opposition from other juice firms was one of the driving forces that led to a final 
decision favourable to SMEs.  
 
                                                 
44  Federation of Hong Kong Industries. Public Consultation on the Way Forward for 
Competition Policy in Hong Kong.  Submission to the Hong Kong Economic Development 
and Labour Bureau (2007). Available at 
http://www.industryhk.com/textonly/tc_chi/news/news_sp/files/070205.pdf (last visited 
October 10, 2010). 
45 OFT, OFT Urges SMEs to Report Anti-competitive Practices. The Office of Fair Trading, 
Press Release, 21 July (2005). Available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-
updates/press/2005/129-05 (last visited January 25, 2011). 
46 Id. 
47 See Economics References Committee, The Effectiveness of the Trade Practices Act 1974 
in Protecting Small Business. The Senate Economic References Committee, Canberra: Senate 
Printing Unit (2004). 
48 See Foer, fn. 25.  
49 Id. 
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3.3 China’s AML Does Not Protect SMEs Per Se   
3.3.1 SMEs May Not Be Protected Due to Efficiency Considerations  
The enforcement of antitrust laws may not always accord with the interests of 
SMEs. In many instances, large firms are more efficient and can afford the funds 
needed for innovation, thereby bringing down prices, improving the quality of 
existing products and possibly offering new products for consumers. It is 
acknowledged by the EU that agreements may restrict competition, but may also 
improve the quality of existing products and have the potential to develop new 
products or new services.
50
 Article 15 of China’s AML clearly states that any 
agreement with the following purposes shall be exempted from the application 
of articles 13 and 14 that prohibit monopoly agreements. 
(1) For the purpose of improving technologies, researching and developing 
new products; 
(2) For the purpose of upgrading product quality, reducing cost, improving 
efficiency, unifying product specifications or standards, or carrying out 
professional labour division; 
(3) For the purpose of enhancing operational efficiency and reinforcing the 
competitiveness of small and medium-sized operators; 
(4)  For the purpose of achieving public interests such as conserving 
energy, protecting the environment and relieving the victims of a 
disaster and so on; 
(5) For the purpose of mitigating serious decrease in sales volume or 
obviously excessive production during economic recessions; 
(6) For the purpose of safeguarding the justifiable interests in the foreign 
trade or foreign economic cooperation; or  
(7) Other circumstances as stipulated by laws and the State Council. 
    The exemption clauses appear to be quite generous, implying that large firms 
meeting certain criteria have a good chance of being granted antitrust immunity. 
In these clauses, efficiency has been given substantial consideration. There are 
three types of efficiency: allocative, dynamic and productive. Allocative 
efficiency is achieved when a firm employs the optimal level of resources using 
the most efficient technology, produces an output level that is socially desirable, 
and where the price of the product equals the firm’s marginal cost. A monopoly 
agreement or a merger could result in allocative inefficiency and a deadweight 
loss. Dynamic efficiency involves introducing new products or adopting new 
processes of production. Productive efficiency relates to the most efficient use of 
the resources and production methods currently available to the firm. As a result, 
a given output can be achieved with least cost. 
                                                 
50 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/consumer_en.pdf (last visited December 
20, 2010). 
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    The antitrust treatment of these three efficiencies is controversial. Given the 
important role played by the application of new production methods and 
equipment in the productive growth of industrial countries, some economists 
argue that dynamic efficiency should be given the highest priority, followed by 
productive efficiency. As a result, allocative efficiency is said to be of less 
policy importance.
51
 Bork takes the view that “the whole task of antitrust” is to 
“improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so 
greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare”.
52
 To 
most economists, competition policy should seek to promote competition and to 
control abuses of market power by firms, and ultimately aims to increase 
efficiency, promote innovation, and improve consumer choice.
53
 Many 
developed economies’ antitrust authorities have embraced these economic ideas 
in their decision-making. As a result, in the airlines industry, many airline 
mergers and alliances have gone unchallenged despite the opposition from 
smaller airlines.  
    Efficiency may also be a significant consideration in the merger review 
process. Article 28 of the AML implicitly mentions this. It states that the 
concentration may be allowed if it “will bring more positive impact than 
negative impact on competition, or the concentration is pursuant to public 
interests”.  
    In the Coca-Cola-Huiyuan case, MOFCOM considered the possible effect of 
the acquisition on technological advances and determined that the proposed 
concentration would damage competition and innovation in the juice market, 
although there was no quantitative analysis for this claim.    
 
3.3.2 SMEs May Be Prosecuted under the Current AML And Its 
Implementation Rules    
Despite agreeing that SMEs do not normally possess market power and that they 
should be exempted from competition provisions governing mergers and abuse 
of market power, Lin and Chen (2008) have pointed out that no firms should be 
                                                 
51 See Brodley, J.F., The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and 
Technological Progress, 62 New York University Law Review, 1020-1053(1987); Jorde, 
T.M. & Teece, D.J. Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition and Antitrust, 
4 The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 75-96 (1990); Jorde, T.M. & Teece, D.J., Antitrust, 
Innovation and Competitiveness, Oxford University Press, New York (1992). 
52 Bork, R.H., The Antitrust Paradox. The Free Press, New York, NY, at 91 (1993). 
53 Kadiyali, V., Sudhir, K. & Rao, V.R., Structural Analysis of Competitive Behavior: New 
Empirical Industrial Organisation Methods in Marketing, 18 International Journal of 
Research in Marketing, 161-186 (2001). 
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exempted from prohibition of hardcore cartels involving price-fixing, market 
allocation, production and sales quotas, and bid rigging, as these practices 
generate more harm than benefit to society.
54
  Also, the effectiveness of the 
antitrust laws would be diluted if some players were given full immunity.
55
 
    Several complementary implementation regulations were issued by the NDRC 
and SAIC and became effective from 1 February 2011. These rules include 
NDRC’s Regulations on Anti-Price Monopoly and Procedural Regulations on 
Administrative Enforcement of Anti-Price Monopoly, and SAIC’s three sets of 
regulation: Regulations on Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements, Regulations on 
Prohibiting an Abuse of a Dominant Market Position, and Regulations on 
Prohibiting an Abuse of Administrative Power. The new regulations spell out 
the anti-competitive pricing and non-pricing conduct prohibited under the AML 
and what conduct might constitute an abuse of dominance.  Apparently any 
firms, including SMEs, engaging in any price and non-price agreement, 
explicitly or tacitly, will be caught by these new implementation rules except 
those fall within Article 15 of the AML listed in previous section.       
    Both the AML and these new regulations prohibit industry associations from 
organising monopoly agreements. This has implications for SMEs as many of 
them are active members of the associations in China. The NDRC imposed a 
fine of RMB 500,000 on the Zhejiang Fuyang Paper Mills Association in 
January 2011 for facilitating price-fixing and output restriction activities, 
although the vice president of the Association argued that the rise in price was 
due to an increase in input prices and that the members wanted the Association 
to stop cut-throat competition in this industry.
56
 This might be the first 
enforcement of the AML on a price cartel in China and a good lesson for SMEs.  
As China does not have an antitrust tradition, there is an urgent need for the 
industry associations and their members to be informed of the relevant laws and 
regulations. SMEs can be hurt as both buyers and sellers by big firms, but 
colluding or engaging in exclusive dealing facilitated by an industry association 
might render them liable to the AML.  
    As mentioned earlier, SMEs are generally not in a dominant position, nor do 
they possess the ability to exercise market power. However, SMEs should 
understand that whether market power is being used depends on how the 
                                                 
54 See Lin and Chen, fn. 42. 
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Commission of India. Luthra & Luthra Law offices, New Delhi (2008). Available at 
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regulators define the relevant market. Market definition involves the delineation 
of a set of boundaries in both geographic and product spaces. Generally, the 
more narrowly the market is defined, the more likely a firm or firms will be 
found to have market power. Firms are thus prone to advocate wider definitions 
than those adopted by competition authorities.  
    Vesterdorf (2001) noted that an abuse of dominance may have a relatively 
local or regional character in the EU and there is no de minimis rule if an abuse 
of market dominance is detected in the defined market.
57
  A SME may produce a 
niche-product that is not easily copied and produced by other firms. A small 
service provider may charge high prices at a location where other competitors 
have difficulty in entering. This will certainly place the SME in a dominant 
position in that market and accordingly it may be caught by the AML and its 
implementation rules.  
 
3.3.3 Does “Public Interest” Shield SMEs? 
Terms such as “welfare” and “public interest” (or public benefit) have been 
frequently mentioned in competition statutes. In China’s AML, “public interest” 
is actually one of the goals stated in Article 1. Article 28 allows an approval to 
be granted for a proposed concentration that is in accord with the public interest. 
However, Round and Zuo (2008) warn that care must be taken in interpreting 
these terms.
58
 Consumer welfare is only part of the public interest and the latter 
bears a much broader meaning that is open to different interpretations, 
“especially with respect to the weights to be given to the benefits and costs of 
possible outcomes and to the distribution of benefits and costs”.
59
 “Public 
interest” does not necessarily mean the same thing as economic efficiency.
60
 To 
some regulators, there is a trade-off between them. For example, economic 
efficiency can be compromised if the “public interest” goal is pursued. It is often 
up to the regulator and the court to define the meaning of “public interest”.  The 
Australian Competition Tribunal has determined that the term “public benefit” 
should be given its widest possible meaning.
61
 In practice, the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) tends to discount benefits if 
                                                 
57  Vesterdorf, P.L., Competition Policy and SMEs: The Case of Denmark Within the 
European Union. Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies, 2001 Annual Forum, Misty Hills, 
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58 See Round & Zuo, fn. 2. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See the Qantas/Air New Zealand case decision paragraphs177-185 for a summary of the 
interpretation of “public benefit”, Qantas Airways Limited (2004) ACompT 9, available on 
ACT website http://www.act.gov.au (last visited March 20, 2011). 
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they are not in a form of direct benefits to consumers.
62
 As a result, “efficiencies 
in the form of cost savings tend to be discounted by the ACCC if they are not 
substantially passed through to consumers in the form of lower prices or 
improved services”.
63
  
    Some examples of “public interest” such as “conserving energy, protecting 
the environment and relieving the victims of a disaster” are given in Article15 of 
China’s AML. However, these are only part of the “public interest” and this 
concept remains ambiguous due to the ambiguous wording used in the AML. 
For example, Li and Han (2010) noted that some clauses in Articles 27 may 
have relevance to public interest such as considering “the impact of 
concentration on entry and innovation”, “the impact on consumers and other 
business operators”, and “the impact of concentration on national economic 
development”.
64
  They also inferred the possible meaning of public interest from 
the decision of the Coca-Cola-Huiyuan Case, which includes: the interests of 
consumers, the interests of all competitors for fair competition and the interests 
of the whole industry and the national economy. Further clarification and 
interpretation may have to be left to the antitrust agencies in the future 
enforcement of the AML.  
    The implications of the lack of a systematic and transparent interpretation of 
the term “public interest” are twofold. On the one hand, it could be taken as an 
excuse to protect state enterprises and certain monopoly industries. On the other 
hand, it means that there is a role to play for SMEs in arguing for their own 
interests. In fact, SMEs are consumers when acquiring inputs for their own 
production. In addition, to keep markets competitive, ideally a core number of 
SMEs is needed in the market, or at least potential entry by them should be 
feasible or possible. These considerations could fall within a broad category of 
public interest and should be considered by the decision-makers.   
    On 15 July 2009,  MOFCOM enacted the Measures for the Examination of 
the Concentration of Business Operators (which came into effect on 1 January 
2010), explicitly indicating that “MOFCOM may conduct a hearing to carry out 
the investigation, collect evidence and listen to the opinions of relevant parties 
during the examination”.  Therefore, an SME can file an objection against a 
proposed merger or request divestiture of part of the assets or business of the 
participating business operators. An SME may apply for access to licensing 
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technologies including patents, know-how and other intellectual properties as 
compensation to mitigate the damage as a result of the concentration.  SMEs 
should take full advantage of the AML and these complementary rules to 
maximise their own welfare.     
 
4 Conclusion  
Any business, no matter what size and no matter what sector it operates in, 
should have a good understanding of the competition laws of its own country as 
well as those of the countries it does business with to avoid conduct that is 
banned by the laws. This paper has reviewed the competition policy of the US, 
EU and China, with an emphasis on China’s AML and its implications for SMEs. 
Despite a tendency towards the goal of promoting economic efficiency that is 
advocated by economists and in turn embraced by many countries, it appears 
that China’s AML still focuses on a range of goals including the ambiguous 
“public interest”. Contrary to the popular view that SMEs benefit from the 
competition laws, worldwide evidence shows that they are reluctant to get 
involved in antitrust litigations against large firms because of the possible high 
legal costs and time and energy involved. At the same time, there is also an 
urgent need to promote an awareness of antitrust compliance in China and 
educate SMEs on how to avoid breaching the new antitrust regulations. SMEs 
should take full advantages of the AML and its implementation rules to fight for 
their own interests and gain equal opportunities for market access.  
 
 
